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where the prisoner was serving a valid sentence at the time of
the petition.' 2 In an Iowa case, although the trial court erred on
its basis for sustaining the writ, the appellate court noted that the
petitioner had served time equivalent to the only valid sentence
against him and concluded that he was entitled to discharge by
some proceeding to that end, and granted immediate release.'
The Federal Rules have been held sufficiently flexible to allow
credit for a prior void sentence. 14
While these cases are only a sparse minority, it is submitted
that their reasoning has merit in regard to assuring substantial
justice to a prisoner who has served long years of confinement
under an invalid conviction.
This is not to discount the desirability of maintaining a
stable form of procedure in the face of "hard" cases. 15 But it is
the continual function of our system of law to develop the pro-
cedures by which the rights of the individual are kept in balance
with the judicial process. In this respect the Midgett decision
should cause reflection and debate over the proper ends to these
means.
P. T. W.
PROPERTY-DAMAGES FOR TIMBER TRESPASS
A 1957 case' decided in the Supreme Court of Appeals of
Virginia evidences that Virginia is in accord with the majority
of states and the Restatement views regarding the assessment of
damages for timber trespass.
The facts of the case show that the defendant, without per-
mission of the plaintiff, and in the face of repeated warnings that
he was trespassing on the plaintiff's land, cut and removed virgin
timber from the plaintiff's land, and manufactured it into lumber.
The defendant asserted that the cutting and removal was done
under an oral contract of sale. The contract referred to was
12 Ex Parte Bell, 256 S.W.2d 413, Tex.Cr.App. (1953).
Is Bennett v. Ha~lowell, 203 Iowa 352, 212 N.W. 701 (1927).
1 4 Ekberg v. U. S., 167 Fed.2d 380 (1948).
15 See dissent to Lang v State, supra, Note 11.
1 Barnes v. Moore, 199 Va. 227, 98 S.E.2d 683 (1957).
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shown to be for the sale of cut over timber, on nearby land
owned by a kinsman of the defendant. As an intelligent and
experienced lumber operator, the defendant doubted the identity
and location of the land; but his doubt caused him to make only
superficial inquiries. Instead of having the title examined, he
relied on statements of others including boundary affirmations
of an aged, senile and nearly blind kinsman of the defendant who
was easily influenced and who originally had been induced into
the true contract partly through the influence of alcohol. The
appellate court correctly affirmed the trial court's finding of
gross negligence on the part of the defendant.2 Judgment was
entered against the defendant for the gross negligence, the dam-
ages being measured by the ascertained manufactured value of
the timber.
The special damages awarded in such cases of trespass have
an interesting and venerable origin reaching at least as far back
into antiquity as 533 A. D. The Institutes of Justinian published
in that year provide an early example of accession where creation
of a valuable painting on someone else's tablet innocently ac-
quired by the painter, would give the painter tide to both the
painting and the tablet, subject to an action of utilis actio by the
owner of the tablet for the value thereof. However, if the tablet
had been stolen by the painter or anyone else, the owner of the
tablet could bring an action of theft.3 The principle has been
applied in England and in this country to determine the amount
of damages for coal taken from a mine as the result of an honest
mistake as to the true ownership.4
2The decision is also in keeping with 542 of Restatement of the Law of
Restitution. It is interesting to note that 34 Am.Jur. S12, p. 498, holds
that in contracts for the sale of timber wherein immediate cutting and
removal is not specified or contemplated, the timber is considered to
be realty. Oral contracts of this nature are unenforceable under the
Statute of Frauds. This unenforceability leaves the defendant without
an enforceable claim of title and where trespass is also present is
further indicia of willful negligence. In the instant case the court did
not discuss this aspect, possibly because the timber was removed with-
in a reasonable time. In this connection, Hurley v. Hurley, 110 Va.
31 (1909), holds that oral contracts for the sale of standing timber to
be removed immediately, or within a reasonable time, are not within
Section Four of the Virginia Statute of Frauds.
8 The Institutes of Justinian by T. C. Sandars, MA. Lib. A1 Tit. I, Sec. 34,
p. 197.
4 Martin v. Porter, 5 Mee. & W. 351; Morgan v. Powell, 3 Ad. & E.N.S.
The case of Wooden Ware Company v. United States,5
which represents the weight of authority in this country and in
England, propounded the following principles for the assessment
of damages for timber trespass:
1. A furtive, fraudulent, or willful trespasser is liable to
the true owner for the full value of the property at
the time and place of demand or of suit brought,
with no deduction for his labor and expense.
2. A defendant who, without notice of wrong, has
purchased from a willful trespasser, stands in the
trespasser's shoes and is liable for the value at the
time of such purchase. Such defendant is not liable
to the original owner for any increase in value which
he adds to the property after purchase.
3. An unintentional, mistaken, or inadvertent trespasser
is liable for the value of the timber at the time of con-
version, but is not liable for any addition to its value
by cutting, transportation, or manufacture. 6
4. An innocent vendee from an unintentional or mis-
taken. trespasser is liable for the value at the time and
place of conversion, but is not liable for any amount
which he and his vendor may have added to its
value.7
278; Wood v. Morewood, 3 Id. 440; Hilton v. Woods, Law Rep. 4
Eq. 432; Jegan v. Vivian, Law Rep. 6 Ch.App. 742. And see Wooden
Ware Company v. United States, 106 U.S. 432, 1 S.Ct. 398 (1882) and
authorities cited therein.
5 Ibid.
6 Barnes v. Moore, supra, rounds out this principle by holding that where
a timber trespass, even though made in error or mistake, is committed
in bad faith, or recklessly, or in willful disregard of rights of others,
or by failure to do what an ordinary, reasonable, and prudent man
would do under the circumstances, the trespasser's conduct constitutes
gross negligence and the trespasser is liable for the full value of the
timber including any improvements he may have made upon it by
manufacturing it into lumber. See also Restatement of the Law of
Torts, §927, par. f, p. 651, and Illustration 5, p. 652.
7 In such cases the owner of the chattel is not allowed to recover the value
added by the labor of the non-willful trespasser or innocent purchaser
from a non-willful trespasser, since it is recognized even in courts of
law that an equitable and quasi-property right is acquired by one who
adds value to property by his labor, although the property upon which
it is expended may be that of another, when the labor is bestowed in
a bona fide belief of a right to ownership of the property. Indeed,
the principles of accession may intercede to give full title to the tres-
passer.
Barnes v. Moore' places Virginia completely in accord with
the first principle of the Wooden Ware case and in addition pre-
sents the following basic concepts:
1. Every trespass is prima facie willful; where the tres-
pass is conceded, the burden of proof is on the de-
fendant to show that the trespass was not willful."
2. Where the defendant-trespasser, though warned that
he is cutting timber on plaintiff's land, continues
cutting operations in disregard of the warning, he is
guilty of gross negligence.9
The case presented by Barnes v. Moore is noteworthy from
a negative standpoint in that no effort was made to obtain the
treble damages provided for under Virginia statutes.'0 The in-
tent of these statutes is open to several interpretations. From a
literal reading it would appear that the triple damages provided
for by the statute are intended to be in addition to, rather than
an alternative to, all other remedies afforded by law. In keep-
ing with this interpretation it has been stated that a statute pre-
scribing damages to be recovered for timber trespass does not
prevent the application of another provision providing for re-
covery of double damages." Where a statute provides for double
or treble damages, the excess recovery over the actual damages is
considered punitive in character; punitive damages not lying for
damages occasioned merely by ordinary negligence. The pur-
pose of this is to subject only the gross wrongdoer to an extraor-
dinary liability by way of punishment. The writer has dis-
covered no case applying the treble damage statutes,' 2 although
similar West Virginia statutes have been applied in that state.u
sBarnes v. Moore, supra; Wood and Others v. Weaver, 121 Va. 250, 92
S.E. 100 (1917); U.S. v. Home Stake Min. Co, 117 Fed. 481 (1902).
Note also that Virginia Code, §59-210 (1950) states that in any action,
suit, prosecution or controversy concerning converting trees into logs
without consent of the owner, the person (other than the owner of
such land) claiming to be the owner of the property, must prove his
ownership to sustain his claim.
9 Barnes v. Moore, supra. See also Restatement of the Law of Torts, §929,
par. e.
10Va. Code, §§ 8-906, 8-910 (1950).
11 15 Am. Jut. §§299-300, p. 742.
12 Va. Code §§8-906, 8-910 (1950).
Is Darnell v. Wiemouth, 69 W.Va. 704, 72 S.E. 1023 (1911).
The State of Washington has allowed treble. damages for willful
conversion of fruit trees.'.
In summary, Barnes v. Moore places Virginia in accord with
the view of the majority concerning damages for timber tres-
pass as exemplified by the Restatement and the Wooden Ware
case views. It is submitted that in future cases, whenever a tres-
pass resulting from an intentional or grossly negligent act is in-
volved, consideration be given to the benefits obtainable from the
utilization of the Virginia treble damage statutes.
H. D. M.
TORTS-LIBEL AND SLANDER
The incredible judicial inertia,' which has existed since the
sixteenth century 2 in regard to the alleged distinction between
libel and slander,3 has been overcome at long last in the recent
New York case of Shor v. Billingsley.4 An action for defamation
was instituted on the basis of certain interpolations, disparaging
to the plaintiff, made by the defendant on his television show.
The statements upon which this action was predicated were as
follows:
"Mr. Billingsley: Yes, he (Plaintiff) is. Want to know
something? I wish I had as much money as he owes."
"Mr. Birsson: Owes you or somebody else?"
"Mr. Billingsley: Everybody-oh, a lot of people." 5
Defendant's main contentions were that there was no def-
14 Lawson v. Helmich et al., 146 P.2d 537 (1944).
1 Prosser on Torts, Ch. 19, 93, pp. 595-596 (2nd Ed.) (1955).2 Holdsworth, Defamation in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, 41
L.Q.Rev. 13 (1925); Holdsworth, Defamation in the Sixteenth and
Seventeenth Centuries, 40 L.Q.Rev. 302 (1924).
3"Libel was originally written defamation, while slander was oral; the
present tendency is to make the distinction on the basis of permanence
of form, or potentiality of harm, similar to writing or printing"
Prosser on Torts, Ch. 19, 593, pp. 584-596 (2nd Ed.) (1955).
4 158 N.Y.S.2d 476 (1956) on Reargument, Jan. 8, 1957.
5 Ibid. at 478.
